"If you could reliably secure a 16% annual return, there would be no need to bring in Korean money. Wouldn't American capital rush in first?"
That was the remark of an expert well versed in international investment, made while negotiations on investment in the United States were in full swing. The point was that while the government deserves credit for holding firm to the principle of commercial rationality so that taxpayer money is not wasted in the course of investing in the U.S., fixating on that principle alone would make it hard to find projects worth investing in. The expert added that because these are projects in which both governments are involved, it would be preferable to identify ventures that are unlikely to materialize if left to the private sector alone.
The government is in fact understood to have had considerable difficulty selecting suitable projects for the U.S. investment program. A government official familiar with the negotiations said, "When we first received the projects the U.S. side proposed early in the talks, the first thing that came over us was a sigh," adding, "Without even looking closely, most of them appeared unlikely to turn a profit." Projects with high returns and low risk can raise as much money as they need in the U.S. capital market, so it is hardly surprising that the ventures seeking to lean on the U.S. government's support were uniformly in difficult shape. The prevailing view is that this is also why it took the government nearly 10 months to single out the first project.
For this reason, some express regret that greater weight should have been given to the strategic dimension of investing in the U.S. Reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, for example, is an industry that would be difficult to carry out domestically any time soon, even if Korea secured the authority to do so through security negotiations. The contamination generated at reprocessing facilities is enormous, making even the construction of such facilities a formidable challenge. One official from the ruling party said, "If we had pursued a project to attempt nuclear fuel reprocessing in the U.S. first, based on our technology, it would have served the strategic interests of both countries," adding, "I wanted to throw my weight behind projects like that even if they ate into the principal, but the government's plan was lacking in that respect."
Beyond that, non-light-water small modular reactors (SMRs), fusion reactors, space development and rare earth refining facilities can also be counted as industries that are difficult for Korea to pursue on its own but where the two countries could generate synergy together. If the money has to be spent in any case, the argument goes, what is needed is the wisdom to boldly secure strategic rationality rather than fretting over the calculator.
