An explosion believed to have been caused by a landmine occurred on the morning of Sept. 21 during an operation to clear a new search route inside the Demilitarized Zone on the western front, in an area under the Army's 25th Infantry Division. The site was several dozen meters from a zone where North Korean troops are suspected of having planted mines south of the Military Demarcation Line. Two South Korean soldiers were seriously wounded, and a medical evacuation helicopter was deployed for an emergency airlift despite the no-fly designation over the area, an unusual step.
The operation that day was aimed at opening a new search route so that a United Nations Command field inspection could reach the suspected North Korean minefield south of the MDL. That means the accident site was not a route South Korean troops normally searched but a high-risk area. The blast reportedly occurred as the unit was returning after completing the route-clearing operation for the day.
The People Power Party, however, has criticized what it calls a delay in the field investigation into the suspected mine explosion in the DMZ. The military responded immediately, stressing that because the area was not a regular route but one being newly cleared and therefore highly dangerous, it would conduct a thorough investigation only after securing the safety of its personnel through rehearsals and safety measures.
As of the 27th, six days after the explosion, the cause of the blast and who planted the mine remain unconfirmed. On the afternoon of the 26th, however, members of the United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission and South Korean troops entered the DMZ together to check operational readiness ahead of a joint field investigation. The following five questions examine whether a prompt field investigation is being avoided or is simply not yet possible.
First, why has the timing of the field investigation become contentious?
The People Power Party and other opposition figures have raised the possibility that North Korean troops planted the mine. They argue for a prompt field investigation, noting that rain fell across most of the country, including Paju in Gyeonggi Province where the accident occurred, during the Chuseok holiday and could have damaged conditions at the site.
A stream runs near the site, raising the possibility that key evidence could be washed away or that changes in the terrain could make the site itself hard to locate. The military, however, says the site is not a regular search route but an extremely dangerous area adjacent to the MDL, and that securing the safety of soldiers comes first — leaving the two sides at odds.
So how dangerous is the site of the mine blast?
The urgency of the military's response offers a partial clue. Before sending a medical evacuation helicopter into the DMZ to airlift the two officers, including a badly wounded search battalion commander, the South Korean military notified the North. A nearby guard post even broadcast a message saying a helicopter was entering because casualties had occurred, using the North Korean word for helicopter. The step appears to have been a safety precaution to avoid provoking North Korean troops.
More important, the blast site lies several dozen meters from the area suspected of being a North Korean minefield. The site is also overgrown with vegetation reaching waist height on an adult, leaving it a blind spot for surveillance. Because it is not a route the military normally searched, there is a risk of a second explosion from another mine.
First Forensic Results Expected This Week
How does this compare with the 2015 wooden-box mine incident, for which the North apologized?
The site of North Korea's 2015 wooden-box mine provocation was a search area inside the DMZ that South Korean troops entered frequently and where safety had been established. This blast, by contrast, occurred where troops were opening a new search route using mine detectors, as the operation's name indicates, and where the safety of personnel is not assured.
Unlike the wooden-box mine case, the area is a surveillance blind spot with no thermal observation device to have recorded the incident as it unfolded. Detailed analysis of body camera footage worn by the troops approaching the site is also needed. The military's position is therefore that a joint field investigation can proceed only once command and control, communications and safety measures have secured the protection of its personnel.
Even so, why does determining the cause of the explosion matter?
The blast occurred while South Korean troops were conducting a search operation inside the DMZ, and what deserves attention is that South Korean soldiers were gravely injured by what may have been a North Korean provocation on South Korean territory. If the mine turns out to have been planted as part of North Korea's fortification of the border, a strong response from South Korean authorities would be unavoidable. As a violation of the Armistice Agreement, it would require at minimum an apology from the North.
That is why it matters whether the mine that exploded was North Korean. If it was, investigators must determine whether it was deliberately planted or washed away by heavy rain. Confirming whether it was a South Korean mine is also important. Concluding that it was a North Korean mine without establishing the facts could heighten military tension between the two Koreas.
The M14 anti-personnel mine typically used by the South Korean military does not cause injuries as severe as those in this case when protective gear is worn. For that reason, officials inside and outside the military have raised the possibility of a more powerful North Korean anti-personnel mine, such as a wooden-box mine. The military has asked the National Forensic Service to examine evidence collected at the site, including mine-protective overshoes. First results are expected around this week.
When, then, will a prompt field investigation be possible?
The Joint Chiefs of Staff says a thorough joint field investigation can be conducted only once the safety of its personnel is secured through command and control, communications, the organization and training of the operating team, stage-by-stage safety assessments of the access route, and rechecks of surveillance and communications conditions. It is also discussing the division of tasks with the United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission.
Against that backdrop, members of the United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission and South Korean troops entered the DMZ together on the afternoon of the 26th to check operational readiness. A joint field investigation therefore appears likely to follow soon.
Independent lawmaker Han Dong-hoon said at a news conference in front of the Ministry of National Defense building in Yongsan on the 26th that the United Nations Command had pushed for a prompt field investigation but that, over South Korean military objections, the two sides agreed to conduct a joint investigation on the 29th, after the Chuseok holiday. He added that he understood the ministry had since moved the joint investigation to the 27th as public suspicion and anger mounted over that decision.
