Since June, the government has revised the Farmland Act to tighten disposal orders on farmland and to impose enforcement fines of 25%, and it is now conducting a comprehensive audit of all farmland. Officials in charge of farmland at city, county and district offices, as well as at town and village offices, check ownership, actual use, idle land, unauthorized conversion and illegal leasing from September through November each year, with the aim of correcting violations of the Farmland Act and managing farmland more efficiently.
The opposition party has pushed back, arguing that the measure forces farmers to sell off private property and that the state is seizing farmland from those who refuse. Some farmers share the fear that their land could be taken by the state. In other words, contrary to the government's policy intent, they are voicing psychological anxiety and a sense of threat to their livelihoods.
Much of the fierce resistance from the opposition and from many farmers stems from the government's clumsy administration. The problem is that it offered only the policy rationale for why a farmland audit is necessary, created an atmosphere of fear by vowing harsh punishment for farmland speculation and illegal conversion, and pushed the policy through in haste. As the controversy dragged on, the government has floated a series of remedies, including allowing land to be entrusted to the Farmland Bank, relief for customary leases and a grace period for converting to formal leases. Yet it has not laid out the standards or the detailed plans for how and by when these remedies will be put in place. So farmers remain uneasy. Government policy could render their practices illegal, and they may find themselves unable to predict what comes next. Had the government fully explained the purpose and rationale of the policy before launching the audit, gathered the views of farmers and reflected the particular conditions of rural communities and the realities farmers face, this social conflict and discord might have been prevented.
To mend these problems, the government should reflect three points in its policy going forward. First, it needs to draw up policy that distinguishes farmland in the Seoul metropolitan area and on the fringes of large cities from farmland elsewhere. Around the capital region and major cities, a shortage of urban land drives expansion, and when farmland is rezoned its price moves higher. That is where speculation in farmland arises. Farmland in other regions, by contrast, will not survive unless outside labor and capital flow in, rather than being governed by the principle that land should belong to those who till it. Rural areas are aging, and young people are not moving in. What this means is that rural regions will eventually disappear. In the end, the farmland system too must now be applied differently depending on the region.
Second, an exemption is needed for inherited farmland. Many children of farmers moved to the cities after industrialization. Their parents' generation has passed away and they have inherited farmland, but they cannot bring themselves to sell it. It is a precious legacy their farming parents devoted their lives to building, and for the children it is a hometown that offers rest for body and mind. They also own the family home where they spent their childhood. They do not want to become undutiful children who abandon their hometown and dispose of farmland that was their parents' property, even if it is now legally theirs. Policy should take such public sentiment into account.
Third, the government must acknowledge the possibility that farmland prices will fall and prepare a plan for public purchases. Outside the Seoul metropolitan area, finding a buyer for farmland is not easy. Farmland is a farmer's entire estate. It is a means of production, but it is also the asset that secures retirement. If large volumes of farmland come onto the market, prices cannot but fall. Farmland tied up in loans could end up as "underwater farmland." The government says it is also considering purchases through the Farmland Bank, but there is no concrete plan on when or at what price. It is also unclear how much the Farmland Bank is able to buy, and whether it can buy when sellers want to sell. There are many obstacles before this can be implemented. The government wants to buy cheaply, and farmers want to sell dear. Only by setting out clear standards for its purchase plan can the government reduce such conflict.
Even if the public partly agrees that a farmland audit is necessary, the policy must be supplemented as soon as possible so that it does not commit the folly of hastening the demise of rural communities. And the data built through the audit should be used to set a new direction for farmland policy, and serve as an occasion for drawing a bigger picture of how to revive the countryside.
